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Abstract 
Corporate restructuring during the 1980s is argued to have focused on improving firm perform-
ance by increasing related and decreasing unrelated diversification. The restructuring patterns of top food 
manufacturing firms do not support this; instead, much of the restructuring appears to have been driven 
by the pursuit of stronger market positions. 
The authors wish to thank Dennis Henderson, Ian Sheldon and two anonymous referees for their 
insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1. Introduction 
Restructuring's Effect on Related and Unrelated 
Diversification Among Top Food Manufacturing 
Firms in the 1980s 
The 1980s are likely to be remembered as the "Decade of the Deal" as a large number of firms 
were actively engaged in major corporate restructuring through mergers, acquisitions, leveraged and 
management buyouts, and selloffs. By the end of the decade, an estimated $1.3 trillion had been spent 
on shuffling assets [O'Neal, 1990], with food and tobacco manufacturers among the most active partici-
pants. They were involved in five of the twenty largest mergers, acquisitions, and leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs) made between 1980 and 1989. The LBO of RJR Nabisco in 1989 holds the record price tag of 
$26.4 billion. 
Observers have argued that the key difference between corporate restructuring in the 1980s and 
that attendant to the 1960s merger wave was in its effect on firm diversification or the degree of related-
ness between the acquiring and acquired firms' lines of business [e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1990, 1991 ; 
Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990]. The earlier wave was more conglomerate in nature with firms mak-
ing large numbers of acquisitions in lines of business not closely related and, in some cases, totally 
unrelated to their core lines. Much of the conglomerate expansion of the 1960s and 1970s was under-
taken to exploit efficiency or market power opportunities that supposedly exist in diversified firms [Hall 
and Weiss, 1967; Shepherd, 1972; Greer, 1984]. However, studies have shown that this strategy largely 
failed. Morek et al. [1990] suggest that much of the unrelated expansion of the previous decade was 
motivated by the personal ambitions of corporate managers that were often at odds with maximizing 
stockholder wealth. 
Even when intentions were good, most diversification attempts failed because the newly added 
lines were either structurally incompatible with the fum's existing businesses or the transactions 
capitalized all potential future benefits [porter, 1987]. For this reason, restructuring in the 1980s is 
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believed to be associated with firms selling off unrelated and acquiring more closely related business lines 
as a result of their reassessment of the expansion strategies of the late 1960s and 1970s. In fact, the 
1980s wave is said to be largely concerned with undoing the results of the earlier one [porter, 1987]. 
Despite this widely held view, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that the overriding objective 
of the latest wave of restructuring activities was to reduce unrelated diversification and increase related 
diversification. We test this common view by analyzing the effects of restructuring on related and 
unrelated diversification among top food and tobacco manufacturing companies. We address whether 
firms in the food/tobacco manufacturing industries have significantly increased the relatedness of their 
business lines through restructuring. Specifically, we test whether: 
Between 1981 and 1989, total diversification and unrelated diversification decreased while 
related diversification increased among a sample of top food & tobacco manufacturing 
companies. 
The sample is constructed from the top 100 firms listed in Food Processing's annual Top 100 
Food Companies Report. The ranking is based on the firms' 1990 food sales rather than total sales. This 
list was checked against USDA's top 50 list [Handy and Henderson, 1990] for omissions. Five more 
firms were added to the top 100 list: Agway, Cargill, Mars Inc., Perdue Inc., and Stroh Breweries. Of 
these 105 firms, 89 are listed on the 1981 Trinet database, 94 are listed on the 1989 Trinet database, and 
83 firms are listed in both 1981 and 1989. These 83 firms were included in the sample. The Trinet data 
report annual sales volume for each plant location. For public companies, the sales figures for the 
individual locations are based on reported company sales and the number of employees at each establish-
ment for each SIC code. For private companies, the sales figures are based on shipments per employee 
in their particular industries. For this study, establishment sales are aggregated to arrive at total company 
sales and subtotals for each 4-digit SIC segment and 2-digit SIC group within each company. There are 
two reasons the top 100 were chosen as the starting point in sample construction: 
1) They represent a significant portion of total production of the food/tobacco manufacturing 
sector. The 83 firms in the Trinet sample collectively account for about 50 percent of all 
food/tobacco sales reported by Trinet. 
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2) Most of the restructuring activities were carried out by large firms and these activities 
likely have a significant impact on the structure and performance of the food/tobacco 
manufacturing industries. 
2. Measuring Restructuring Activity and Changes in Diversification 
Several studies [MacDonald, 1985; Palepu, 1985] of diversification have employed the "entropy 
measure of diversification" first proposed by Jacquemin and Berry [1979]. The entropy index measures 
firm-level diversification, where there are several industry groups and within each industry group there 
are several industry segments [MacDonald, 1985; Palepu, 1985]. For this study, an industry group is 
defined as a 2-digit SIC major group and an industry segment as a 4-digit SIC industry. If a firm 
operates in a total of N 4-digit industries in all the 2-digit major groups, then the firm's total 
diversification (DT) can be measured as: 
N 
DT = L P(Ln(l/ Pi) 
i=l 
where Pi is the share of a firm's sales from the fh 4-digit industry. If we classify the N industry 
segments into M industry groups,. then D~ is a measure of the firm's diversification among 4-digit 
industries in the Jh 2-digit major group: 
DRj = L p! ·Ln(1 / ph 
iEj 
where pi is the share of the fh 4-digit industry oftheJh major group in the firm's total sales in the major 
group. For a firm that operates across more than one 2-digit major group, its 4-digit level diversification 
can be defined as a wei~hted sum of the DR}.s, where pj is the share of the Jh major group in the total 
sales of the firm: 
M 
DR = LDR/pj. 
j=l 
Note that DR measures the relatedness of diversification within ALL the different 2-digit major 
groups. It does not assume a home major group. Since this is an industry study and all sample firms 
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derive most of their sales from food and tobacco, SICs 20 and 21 are treated as the home industry group. 
In all indices presented, we treat SICs 20 and 21 as in the same major group because they involve the 
processing of agricultural products; use similar production and packaging technologies; sell through 
similar distribution channels; and use similar marketing skills. Thus DR20121 is measured as: 
DR20121 = L p;0121 'Ln{l/p;OI2\ 
iE20121 
It is weighted by p2012l, the share of the firm's sales from the food/tobacco group, to yield a measure 
of the share of related diversification that is within the home major group: 
index: 
DR * DR .p20121 20/21 = 20121 . 
Let DU be diversification across 2-digit major groups, then according to the definition of the 
M 
DU = Lpj'Ln(1/P0 
j-=1 
All indices have a theoretical lower limit of zero when the firm is not diversified. They do not 
have a meaningful upper limit so that whether a firm is more or less diversified can only be ascertained 
by comparison with other firms or with itself over time. The focus of this study is on DR* 20121 which 
measures related diversification across 4-digit segments within food and tobacco manufacturing, and DU 
which measures unrelated diversification across 2-digit industry groups. We use these indices to analyze 
changes in diversification among top food companies in the 1980s. 
3. Diversification Patterns 
This section presents diversification indices for sample firms based on the Trinet data. 
Nonparametric tests are conducted to see if changes in diversification indices are statistically significant. 
Sample firms are classified into several restructuring categories according to net changes in their related 
and unrelated diversification. The related diversification hypothesis is then analyzed on the basis of these 
different restructuring patterns. 
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Related, unrelated and total diversification indices for the sample firms are summarized in Table 
1. These indices provide a good overall picture of the extent and direction of firm diversification in the 
food/tobacco manufacturing industries. To ascertain whether changes in diversification indices between 
1981 and 1989 are statistically significant, several test procedures were considered. Instead of the tradi-
tional parametric tests of two population means, nonparametric tests were conducted to see if there have 
been significant changes in the average levels of related and unrelated diversification between 1981 and 
1989. Nonparametric tests were chosen over parametric tests for two reasons. First, traditional paramet-
ric tests of two population means involve assumptions about the distributions of the populations sampled. 
These assumptions are too restrictive in many situations because the exact underlying population distribu-
tions are not known to the researcher. Many nonparametric tests get around this problem by focusing 
on the ranks or order rather than the numerical values of the observations. Second, entropy diversifica-
tion indices are ordinal measures as opposed to cardinal measures in the sense that they measure ordering 
instead of magnitude. Since there is no meaningful upper limit, an index of 1.5 is more diversified than 
an index of 1, but not necessarily by 50%. All that we are concerned about is whether the difference 
between the two is statistically significant. Many nonparametric tests serve this purpose well. More 
specifically, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test was used. This test is analogous to the 
parametric t test for paired observations. The advantage of the signed rank test is that it does not make 
restrictive assumptions about the underlying population distributions and does not rely on the numerical 
Table 1. Summary of Diversification Indices for Sample Firms 
NAME N MEAN ST.DEV VARIANCE MIN MAX 
1981 DR*20/21 83 0.575 0.472 0.223 0.000 1.735 
DU 83 0.678 0.551 0.304 0.000 2.344 
DT 83 1.375 0.859 0.739 0.000 3.560 
1989 DR*20121 83 0.592 0.515 0.265 0.000 1.974 
DU 83 0.683 0.586 0.344 0.000 2.476 
DT 83 1.403 0.917 0.841 0.000 3.709 
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values of the sample elements. The results of the tests are presented in Table 2. For the sample as a 
whole, neither related, unrelated or total diversification indices have changed significantly between 1981 
and 1989. These results contradict the relatedness hypothesis which predicts movements away from unre-
lated and toward related diversification. 
Equally important to overall averages are individual firms' experiences. The average measures 
of diversification tend to mask a lot of movement at the individual firm level. Many firms have under-
taken extensive restructuring during the 1980s. While some firms have continued to become more diver-
sified in the related or unrelated direction or both, other firms have retrenched by focusing on their core 
businesses. There are several distinct patterns of restructuring in the sample, each representing a different 
set of restructuring strategies. Understanding these different patterns of restructuring is crucial to 
understanding the driving force behind restructuring activities in the 1980s. 
Sample firms can be grouped into nine restructuring categories according to net changes in 
DR*20/21 and DU, as shown in Table 3. The cells are labelled in parentheses 1 through 9 followed by 
the number of firms in the category. A zero in related or unrelated diversification is assigned to firms 
with no net change in the level of these diversification indices. Only the 24 firms in Cell 7 truly fit the 
hypothesis, with increased related and decreased unrelated diversification. The two adjacent cells (Cells 
4 and 8) are to some extent consistent with the hypothesis, but the 39 firms in the first row appear to 
contradict the hypothesis in that all have experienced positive net changes in unrelated diversification. 
Of these 39, 18 also had increases in related diversification and the remaining experienced zero or nega-
tive change in related diversification. The 2 firms in Cell 5 ended where they started with no net change 
in either measure. The 17 firms in Cells 6 and 9 became more specialized by retreating into their core 
businesses . 
Of most interest are the 76 firms in the four comer cells (Cells 1, 3, 7 and 9) since they represent 
four distinct patterns of restructuring. These include Cell 7, where restructuring activities are consistent 
with the hypothesis, Cell 9 which is partially consistent with the hypothesis, and two cells that contradict 
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Table 2. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Ranked Sign Tests 
For DR\o/21: 
YEAR 
1989 
1981 
For DU: 
YEAR 
1989 
1981 
For DT: 
YEAR 
1989 
1981 
N 
83 
83 
Wilcoxon Scores (Rank: Sums) 
Classified by Variable YEAR 
Sum of Expected 
Scores Under Ho 
6941.0 6930.50 
6920.0 6930.50 
Std Dev 
Under Ho 
308.96 
308.96 
S = 6941.00 Z = 0.032366 Prob > IZI = 0.9742 
T-Test approx. Significance = 0.9742 
Kruskal-Wallis Test (Chi-Square Approximation) 
CHISQ = 0.00115 DF = 1 Prob > CHISQ = 0.9729 
Sum of Expected Std Dev 
N Scores Under Ho Under Ho 
83 6887.50 6930.50 309.49 
83 6973.50 6930.50 309.49 
S = 6887.50 Z = -.137321 Prob> IZI = 0.8908 
T-Test approx. Significance = 0.8909 
Kruskal-Wallis Test (Chi-Square Approximation) 
CHISQ = 0.01930 DF = 1 Prob > CHISQ = 0.8895 
Sum of Expected Std Dev 
N Scores Under Ho Under Ho 
83 6991.0 6930.50 309.56 
83 6870.0 6930.50 309.56 
S = 6991.00 Z = 0.193825 Prob> IZI = 0.8463 
T-Test approx. Significance = 0.8466 
Kruskal-Wallis Test (Chi-Square Approximation) 
CHISQ = 0.03820 DF= 1 Prob > CHISQ = 0.8450 
Average Scores were used for Ties 
Wilcoxon 2-Sample Test (Normal Approximation) 
(with Continuity Correction of .5) 
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Mean 
Score 
83.63 
83.37 
Mean 
Score 
82.98 
84.02 
Mean 
Score 
84.23 
82.77 
it, Cells 1 and 3. As indicated by this classification, the restructuring activities of the majority of the 
sample firms do not support the hypothesis. In fact, the average level of diversification by sample firms 
increased between 1981 and 1989. This increase in overall diversification was accompanied by different 
patterns of restructuring by individual firms in the sample. There was no clear indication that related 
diversification was the driving force behind restructuring in the food and tobacco manufacturing indus-
tries . 
Table 3. Distribution of Sample Firms Among Restructuring Categories 
NET CHANGE NET CHANGE IN DR*20/21 
IN DU 
+ 0 -
(1) (2) (3) 
+ 18 3 18 
NO NO NO 
(4) (5) (6) 
0 0 2 1 
MAYBE ? NO 
(7) (8) (9) 
- 24 1 16 
YES MAYBE ? 
While most firms with high levels of diversification in 1981 remained highly diversified in 1989, 
the underlying patterns of diversification have changed. Two tobacco firms (Philip Morris and American 
Brands) and two beer companies (Adolph Coors and Anheuser Busch) became more diversified by 
branching out into other food products or nonfood/tobacco products to reduce their dependence on alcohol 
and tobacco. Some of the more specialized firms expanded their food lines (Quaker Oats, Pepsico) while 
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others diversified into nonfood products (Ralston Purina, Perdue). ConAgra and Archer-Daniels-Mid-
land, while continiIing to expand their presence in agricultural commodities processing [Marion and Kim, 
1991], made significant expansions into branded consumer food products and nonfood products to reduce 
their reliance on primary agricultural commodities. Some of the firms with high levels of unrelated 
diversification shed some unrelated lines to focus on their core businesses within the food/tobacco 
manufacturing sector. These include Pepsico, Sara Lee, Philip Morris and Hershey. 
Historically, food manufacturing companies have experienced less cyclical fluctuations in sales 
and profitability than firms in other sectors. These cycles may be among the major reasons for diversifi-
cation attempts. As a result, during the 1960s and 1970s food manufacturing companies tended to be the 
targets of acquisitions by diversifying firms rather than the initiators of such activities. Most food 
companies remained relatively focused on food products throughout the wave of mergers and acquisitions 
during the 1960s and 1970s and were not extensively diversified at the beginning of the 1980s. Because 
of this, there was not much room for diversification to decrease. Therefore while some of the large 
food/tobacco manufacturers were busy unloading some of their unrelated lines during the 1980s, other 
more specialized firms were becoming more diversified by expanding into nonfood/tobacco lines as well 
as other food products. Although DR\oI21 did not register any significant overall changes, firms did 
appear to be converging on the center of the diversification continuum. 
4. Market Position as an Alternative Explanation of Corporate Restr~cturing 
While there was substantial reshuffling of assets by sample firms during the 1980s, the pursuit 
of related diversification did not seem to be the driving force behind the restructuring activities of large 
food/tobacco manufacturing firms in the 1980s. Instead, something in addition to the relatedness of 
diversification may have played a role in the latest round of restructuring. One such objective may have 
been improving the firm's competitive position in the industries in which it operates. A firm's competi-
tive position can be measured by the market shares of its business lines and the growth rates of the 
industries in which these lines are based. 
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This study incorporates the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) matrix which measures a business 
line's competitive position as a function of its market share and industry growth rate. According to the 
BCG matrix, all business lines can be classified into four categories based on each business line's market 
share and the growth rate of the industry in which it operates. These categories are: 
Stars Lines that have a high relative market share and are based in industries that have 
high growth potentials. High industry growth potential and strong competitive position 
mean that these lines have excellent long-term profit and growth opportunities. They will 
generate sufficient profits to finance their own expansion and contribute to the firm's 
overall cash flows. 
Cash cows Lines that have a high relative market share but are based in low-growth 
industries. Low growth means that the industry has limited opportunities for future 
expansion but strong competitive positions mean that these lines can generate substantial 
positive cash flows without significant need for further investments. The firm's best 
strategy is therefore to milk the maximum amount of profits out of these lines before the 
industries go under. 
Question marks These are lines that are based in high growth industries but have low 
relative market shares. These lines have good opportunities for future growth and 
expansion to become a star but may require substantial short-term capital infusion to get 
there. Therefore a decision has to be made on whether the long-term pay-off will be 
sufficient to cover the short-term cash outlays. 
Dogs These are definite losers. These lines have low relative market shares and are 
based in low growth industries. They have weak competitive positions and have no 
potential for future growth and expansion. Trying to gain market share and therefore 
turning it into a cash cow in a stagnating industry can be very costly and risky. They 
may require substantial investments simply to maintain their current positions but will not 
generate significant profits to cover these outlays. 
A graphical representation of the BCG matrix is presented in Figure 1. The vertical scale 
represents industry growth rate, and the horizontal scale measures the business line's relative market 
share. Each circle represents a line of business. The center of each circle represents the position of that 
line on the matrix and the size of each line measures the importance of each line in terms of its revenue-
generating capacity relative to the firm's overall portfolio of business lines. 
In the course of corporate restructuring, a rational decision maker would nurture the stars, keep 
the cash cows and eliminate the dogs. The treatment of the question marks is more difficult because it 
depends on the firm 's evaluations of the lines' potential pay-offs against their short-term capital 
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requirements. Based on this analysis, we expect that most of the acquired lines are either stars or cash 
cows, maybe some question marks, while most of the divested lines are dogs and some question marks. 
Relatedness is only relevant when combined with stars and cash cows. Thus, we tested an alternative 
hypothesis that: 
Between 1981 and 1989, sample firms improved their competitive positions by deleting 
dogs , and adding stars and cash cows. 
Relative Market Share 
High Low 
High CellI : STARS Cell 2: QUESTION MARKS 
.-
Cell 3: CASH COWS Cell 4: OOOS 
Figure 1. The BeG Matrix [Source: Hill and Jones, 1989] 
Based on the BeG matrix, lines added and deleted by sample firms during the 1980s are classified 
into the four categories. Figure 2 shows the number and percentage of added and deleted lines in each 
category. Lines are classified into the High share group if they have at least 5 % relative market shares, 
while those with lower than 5% relative market shares are classified into the Low share group. Industries 
are separated into two groups: those with positive growth rates (the High group) between 1981 and 1989, 
and the those with negative growth rates (the Low group). Almost 40% of the added lines are either stars 
or cash cows and only 6% of the deleted lines are stars or cash cows. By contrast, 63% of the deleted 
lines are dogs and only 20% of the added lines are dogs. By far the largest group of added lines (42 %) 
are question marks. These lines have relatively low market shares but are in growing industries. As a 
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result, they represent good investment opportunities . With the right strategy and capital, they can be 
turned into stars. To achieve that objective, they also require substantial capital infusion and managerial 
attention. Therefore, there is a high rate of failure as evidenced by the fact that 31 % of the deleted lines 
are question marks. Overall, sample firms showed a strong preference for stars and cash cows which 
represent strong market positions and good cash flows. Their dislike for dogs is also clear. The question 
marks deserve more analysis. In restructuring their portfolio of business lines, firms are faced with a 
dilemma. Stars and cash cows are everyone's favorites and are constantly in high demand. But high 
demand for these lines may bid the selling price so high that premiums firms have to pay for these lines 
would wipe out potential future gains. This may partially explain why more stars and cash cows were 
not acquired. One solution to this problem is to acquire lines that are not stars but have a good chance 
of becoming stars. The question marks are good candidates. These lines have good potential and are 
often available at bargain prices [Weston and Chung, 1990]. However, success is not guaranteed. The 
high turnover rate for this group is predicted by the Boston Consulting Group and is evidenced by data 
shown here. 
Relative Market Share 
High 
~ High Cell I : STARS Cell 2: QUESTION MARKS 
~ ~ Added: 99 (13%) Added: 318 (42%) 
~ Deleted: 11 (2%) Deleted: 181 (31 %) 
0 
cS 
£ Added: 187 (25%) Added: 152 (20%) 
~ Deleted: 21 (4%) Deleted: 363 (63%) 
~ Cell 3: CASH COWS Cell 4: DOGS 
Low 
Figure 2. Distribution of Added and Deleted Lines on the 
BeG Matrix 
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Low 
These findings suggest that, during the 1980s, sample firms have been adding manufacturing lines 
that had stronger market positions and deleting manufacturing lines that had weak market positions. This 
type of action is consistent with the retrenching and consolidation strategies of many firms documented 
in other studies [Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Porter, 1987]. Although many lines were added and deleted 
during the period, a closer look at the market positions of added and deleted lines reveals a preference 
for lines that generate near-term cash flows or those that have promising growth potential regardless of 
their relatedness. While these results may not be strong enough to warrant sweeping conclusions, they 
suggest that firms did not try so much to shed "unrelated" lines as to consolidate by eliminating marginal 
lines where they held weak competitive positions. These findings provide tentative support for the alter-
native hypothesis. This preference for stronger competitive positions is important because it may open 
up a different dimension to diversification analysis. Instead of focusing exclusively on diversification and 
its relatedness, it may also be important to look at the impacts of restructuring and diversification on 
firms' competitive positions. 
5. Summary 
Corporate restructuring during the 1980s is argued to have focused on improving firm perform-
ance by increasing related and decreasing unrelated diversification. We examined this hypothesis using 
evidence from the food manufacturing sector and found no support for it. The lack of support for the 
relatedness hypothesis led to testing the alternative hypothesis that corporate restructuring in the top firms 
in the food/tobacco manufacturing industries in the 1980s was aimed at improving firms' competitive 
positions rather than increasing related diversification. Preliminary results suggest that the pursuit of 
improved market positions may have been a major objective of the restructuring activities of the 1980s. 
They also suggest that diversification was only part of the strategic planning, and it was considered 
desirable only if the firm could capture leading positions by diversifying. Firms preferred to avoid lines 
(related or unrelated) where they were relatively weak and focus on lines (again, related or unrelated) 
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where they had competitive advantages. This proposition is supported by evidence that added lines tend 
to have higher market shares and better growth opportunities than deleted lines. Pursuit of market posi-
tion through restructuring may provide an explanation for the structural changes in the food/tobacco 
manufacturing industries during the 1980s. 
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